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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
VALIDITY OF STATE COMPENSATLNG TAX ON
USE WITHIN STATE OF CHATTELS PURCHASED
OUTSIDE STATE. HENNEFORD V. SILAS
MASON COMPANY, INC.1
The State of Washington, after imposing a tax of 2% of
the selling price on all retail sales made in the State, levied
an additional "compensating" tax of 2%6 of the purchase
price for the privilege of using within the State any article
of tangible personal property purchased by the user. It
was provided that the compensating tax did not apply ex-
cept as to property bought at retail, and, where the sale or
use of such property had already been subjected to a tax
under the laws of any State of the United States, it was
abated to the extent of any tax so paid.2 Plaintiffs-appel-
lees brought suit in a Federal court to enjoin the collection
of the tax with reference to materials purchased outside
the State and used within it. A three-judge court granted
the injunction (one judge dissenting), and held the tax in-
valid as a burden on interstate commerce.' On appeal,
HELD (two justices dissenting): Reversed; such a tax is
neither a tax upon the operations of interstate commerce
nor a burden thereon because of any hampering or discrim-
inatory effect.
The obvious purpose of the taxing statute was to meet
the objections normally raised by merchants near State
lines to a retail sales tax-namely, that the sales tax works
unfairly upon them in that it either drives prospective cus-
tomers across the State line or forces the merchants to
absorb the tax instead of passing it on to their customers.
In view of the strenuous and heretofore successful opposi-
tion to a sales tax in Maryland, founded on such considera-
tions, the case assumes considerable local importance.
It is well established that a State may not tax the sale
to a buyer within the State of goods which at the time of
sale are in another State nor the solicitation within the
State of orders for goods which are at the time in another
State." It is equally well established that a State may val-
1 57 S. Ct. 524 (1937).
:Washington Laws, 1935, Ch. 180.
Silas Mason Company, Inc. v. Henneford, 15 F. Supp. 958 (E. D.
Wash.). The State Supreme Court, also by a divided court, bad held the
tax valid in Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 Pac. (2d)
14 (1935).
'Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. Ed. 694,
7 S. Ct. 592 (1887); Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Portland, 268 U. S.
325, 69 L. Ed. 982, 45 S. Ct. 525 (1925). But cf. Wiloll Oil Corp. v. Penn-
sylvania, 294 U. S. 169, 79 L. Ed. 838, 55 S. Ct. 58 (1935).
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idly tax the sale of goods brought into the State, whether
in the original package or not, if such goods, prior to their
sale,, have come to rest and become mingled with the gen-
eral mass of property within the State ;' provided always
that the tax does not discriminate against such goods be-
cause of their origin.' And a line of recent cases has sus-
tained also the power of a State to tax the use within the
State of goods brought in from outside, where such goods
have come to rest within the State prior to the use.7 These
last decisions are considered as controlling by the Supreme
Court in the present case.
The lower court, in holding the tax unconstitutional,
relied primarily on Baldwin v. Seelig,8 and emphasized that
the purpose of the statute was to protect local merchants
against the competition of interstate commerce. In that
case, the Supreme Court had said :? "Neither the power
to tax nor the police power may be used by the State of
destination with the aim and effect of establishing an eco-
nomic barrier against competition with the products of an-
other state or the labor of its residents. Restrictions so
construed are an unreasonable clog upon the mobility of
commerce. They set up what is equivalent to a rampart of
customs duties designed to neutralize advantages belonging
to the place of origin. They are thus hostile in conception
as well as burdensome in results . . . The importer must
be free from imposts framed for the very purpose of sup-
pressing competition from without and leading inescapably
to the suppression so intended."
In the present case, the Supreme Court distinguishes
Baldwin v. Seelig upon the ground that there the New York
statute in effect regulated the price at which milk subse-
quently sent to New York could be sold outside of New
York, by prohibiting the sale in New York of milk produced
and sold outside the State to New York dealers, unless such
5 Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. Ed. 352 (1869); Sonneborn
Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 67 L. Ed. 1095. 43 S. Ct. 643 (1923).
6 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 347 (1876).
7 Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 279 U. S. 499, 73 L. Ed. 475, 49 S. Ct. 188
(1929) ; Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 76 L. Ed. 1232, 52 S. Ct.
631 (1932) ; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249. 77 L. d.
730, 53 S. Ct. 345 (1933) ; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U. S. 249,
77 L. Ed. 1155, 53 S. Ct. 591 (1933); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292
U. S. 86, 78 L. Ed. 1141, 54 S. Ct. 575 (1934). But a tax on the use within
the State of gasoline purchased outside Is invalid as applied to gasoline
used as fuel upon an interstate ferry line, since the tax here is directly
upon the operations of Interstate commerce. Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S.
245, 73 L. Ed. 683, 49 S. Ct. 279 (1929).
8 294 U. S. 511, 79 L. Ed. 1032, 55 S. Ct. 497 (1935).
* Ibid, 294 U. S. 527.
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outside sale was at a price fixed by New York; whereas the
Washington statute left the outside seller free to charge
any price he wished and to ship his goods into Washington
in such amounts as he desired. That the motive behind
the adoption of the statute was to lessen interstate competi-
tion for local retailers was stated to be immaterial, the tax
being valid apart from its motives.
It is difficult completely to reconcile the holding here
with the broad language quoted above from the Baldwin
case, and it would seem that the doctrine there enunciated
must be materially limited. Both' the purpose and effect
of the compensating tax were certainly to protect the local
merchant against the lower prices of outside competitors
by taking away from local buyers the saving effected by
buying outside the State. Indirectly, at least, Washington
was enabled to project its sales tax outside the State and
make it apply to interstate sales. Yet it was the attempt
of New York to project its policy with respect to sales
prices of milk across State lines that was condemned in the
Baldwin case as an attempt to "place itself in a position
of economic isolation;" and it was there stated that this
was not made justifiable by reason of a desire to "protect
her inhabitants from the cut prices and other consequences
of Vermont competition."
It would seem that, under the instant case, the States
are to be regarded as having power to protect their mer-
chants against injurious competition from without, to the
extent that interstate sellers may be forced, indirectly at
least, to compete on equal terms with local sellers. In
other words, that interstate commerce is only to be re-
garded as burdened where it is placed at a disadvantage
as compared with local merchants. Whether adopting the
compensating tax will in practice enable the States to over-
come the difficulties rising out of their inability to tax inter-
state sales directly, would seem at least questionable. The
difficulty of administration is obvious, except as to large
buyers or as to property whose ownership would be a mat-
ter of record in the taxing State.10
10 See note (1936) 11 Wasbington L. R. 54.
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